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THE SEAMLESS WEB
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARTICLE
OF THE NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTION AND THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENT OF IT IN LIGHT OF OTHER VARIANTS
OF THE FORDHAM FORMULA FOR HOME RULE.
CHRISTOPHER C. SCHWABACHER*
The Municipal Corporations Article of the Constitution of North
Dakota, Article 6, was amended on November 8, 1966, to provide
for the establishment of home rule in cities and villages. A substitute
amendment to the article is to be submitted to the voters at the
general election in November 1968. The purpose of the 1968 amend-
ment, according to the North Dakota Legislative Research Com-
mittee which drafted it, is to make the constitutional method of
providing for home rule "more easily comprehensible".' This
article examines the possible defects of the 1966 and 1968 amend-
ments in the context of a detailed discussion of the home rule
formula drafted by Dean Fordham for the American Municipal As-,
sociation and prominent variants of it, because these formulae
reflect the new approach to state-local relations which underlies
both the present and proposed home rule amendments to Article 6.
NEW FORMULA HOME RULE: ITS RATIONALE AND THEORY
The goal of the traditional home rule system is, "... . a definitive
constitutional distribution of governmental powers as between the
state and . . . local units."2 Dean Fordham drafted the new formula
home rule provision for the American Municipal Association because
he felt that traditional home rule had not realized its goal and that
in any case its goal is not appropriate for today's society.8 This
criticism of the objective of traditional home rule points to the
primary assumption underlying the new formula, an assumption
which was articulated even before Dean Fordham drafted the home
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. B.A., Harvard, 1968,
L.,B., 1966; L.L.M., New York University, 1967.
1. R JPORT O1P NORTa DAKOTA LEGISLATIv" CoMMnmm 20, (1967).
2. l'ordham, Home Rule-A.M.A. Model, 44 NAT'L MUN. REV. 137 (1955).
3. Id. at 139.
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rule provision for the American Municipal Association. In 1951 John
P. Keith wrote:
... [I]t can be categorically stated that it is impossible to
rip and rend the functions that government performs in such
a way that the powers of government can be neatly sepa-
rated, packaged and doled out, some to the state and some
to the localities. Any effort to segregate governmental func-
tions by levels of government is doomed a failure because
most of the important governmental services have been
undertaken in part by the various levels of government.
As a result each function has its local aspects, its state
aspects, its federal aspects.4
The proponents of new formula home rule believe that it is unwise
to fragment government power and that the object of home rule
is not to divide power but to create a system where responsibility
can be shared among the several levels of government. Abandon-
ing the fallacious distinction between matters of local and state
concern has a salutary effect upon local government units, because
it gives them a full scope of initiative power and thus encourages
them to take responsibility for the solution of problems which con-
front them. No longer does a municipality have to fear that it
does not have authority to grapple with a difficult situation. A
general grant of power, as distinct from one limited to merely
local affairs, allows the locality to make a rational selection among
all the alternative solutions open to the government sector including
ones not yet attempted: local government units are able to experi-
ment with new solutions to the extent that political realities permit
them. Perhaps, Mr. Paul Ylvisaker most eloquently has expressed
the concept being examined here. He writes that there is:
A trend . . . away from the tradition of exclusive powers,
toward a sharing (and hopefully a harmonious exercise) of
common powers.
And there is logic in the trend. The semantics and legal
fictions of exclusive allocations of powers do not accord with
the "seamless web" of governmental operations in our
times. They suggest boundaries where there are no boun-
daries, absolute distinctions where there are only relative
ones. ...
And more, if governmental action at each level is to
be well conceived and effective; if a citizen is to be drawn
as a whole person into participation . . . and if a system of
4. KEITH, CITY AND COUNTY HOME RuLz IN TEXAS 124 (1951). For later statements
of the sane points, 8ee C0MmITTEE FOR ECONOM1C DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING STATE GOV-
ERNMENT 18 (1967) and Willbern, The States as Com onents in an Areal D'Aston of Pow-
era, in AREA A" POWER 72 (A. Maass ed. 1959).
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countervailing power is - to have any meaning or vitality,
then the concerns and the decisions which the component
area can legitimately undertake ought to embrace the whole
range of matters assigned to the governmental process by
that society in its time. 5
Even if one assumes that a successful constitutional division
can be made between matters of local and state concern either
by describing them in these terms or by specific enumeration, such
a division would be invalid in a very short time because the char-
acter of governmental problems is dynamic rather than static. 6
Within a few months or a few years, changing social and economic
conditions might make what is reasonably a matter of local concern
today a valid object of state power.7 If the constitutional allocation
of power is affected by a general phrase rather than a specific
enumeration, it can be argued that there is nothing inherently
rigid or inflexible in the allocation, because the courts can redefine
the realms of state and local concern to correspond with changing
conditions. The rejoinder to this argument is that it is not the role
of the courts to allocate governmental power, that this is a policy
making function best vested in the legislature which is the policy
making branch of government.8
The concept that localities and the state have distinct areas of
competence and that localities have immunity to some extent from
interference by the state in their area of competence is defective
not only because these areas are impossible to define and local
units need full power to function effectively, but also because there
is a positive value to legislative control of home rule units, especially
with respect to their boundaries and interrelationships. In many
parts of this country, local governments are unable to utilize a
broad grant of home rule authority successfully. In rural areas,
local government units often have too small a population to render
services economically and to raise adequate revenue. In metro-
politan areas, units are typically smaller than the actual metropol-
itan region and, therefore, find it difficult to regulate problems
which are area-wide. In addition, it is not uncommon for a local
5. Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for 'Proper Areal Division of Governmental Powers,
in AREA AND PowER 35 (A. Maass ed. 1959).
6. B. ABERNETHY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGISLATURE 61 (1959) tPage
number from excerpts reproduced by the North Dakota Legislative Research Committee
for use by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Revision May 21, 1963]; Fordbam, eupra
note 2, at 137, 139.
7. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE LEGIS-
LATrVE RESEARCH COUNCIL RELATIVE TO MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 48 (Senate No. 580
March 22, 1961).
8. J. FORDHAM, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS POR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE COM-
MENT No. 3, at 20-21 (1953); N.Y. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE REVISION AND SIMPLI-
FICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, FIRST STEPS TOWARD A MODERN CONSTITUTION 19 (Legis-
lative Doc. No. 58, 1959).
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government unit in a metropolitan area, especially a central city,
to provide services to citizens of the area who are not residents
of the unit and who do not pay local taxes. If home rule is to succeed,
the irrational pattern of local government both in metropolitan and
rural America must be rectified either by cooperative arrange-
ments among local governments or by the supervisory power of
the state legislature. A number of advocates of the new formula
believe that in light of the slow and limited progress made by
local governments in establishing cooperative ventures, and in light
of the fact that the state represents all the citizens of the region,
the legislature should have broad power to reorganize local govern-
ment.9 To the extent that traditional home rule prevents the legis-
lature from altering home rule charters or from interfering with
local affairs, the power of the legislature to restructure local govern-
ment is impeded.
Dean Fordham and other commentators criticize traditional
home rule, primarily because of Dillon's Rule and the questionable
distinction between matters of state and local concern, and suggest
that new formula home rule eliminates these difficultieslo The
typical new formula home rule provision avoids the use of any
language which may be reminiscent of the old state and local con-
cern dichotomy. Virtually all new formula provisions adopt the
idea introduced by Dean Fordham in his American Municipal As-
sociation Model: local units are given a full grant of governmental
power subject only to limitation in the constitution, state statutes,
or local charter." This full grant of power is designed to eliminate
9. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 48
(1966) ; MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, REPORT SUB-
MITIED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 20-23 (Senate No. 650
January 29, 1962); UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
19-20 (1961).
10. Dillon's Rule indicates that a municipality possesses only those powers which are
granted expressly by its charter, state constitution, or statutes; necessarily or fairly im-
plied from such express powers; or essential to the existence of the municipality. C.
RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAw § 4-7, at 70 (1957). The formulation of the rule by the Supreme
Court of North Dakota is typical: "A Municipal Corporation is an agency of the state. It
is purely a creature of statute. [N.D.] Constitution, [Article 6]. It takes its powers
from the statutes which give it life, and has none which are not either expressly or im-
pliedly conferred thereby or essential to effectuate the purposes of its creation. In de-
fining its powers, the rule of strict construction applies, and any doubt as to their exist-
ence or extent must be resolved against the corporation." Lang v. City of Cavalier, 59
N.D. 75, 84, 228 N.W. 819, 822 (1930). See also, Murphy v. City of Bismnarck, 109 N.W.2d
635, 642-43 (N.D. 1961).
11. The American Municipal Association model provision contains 10 sectionS Section
6 is the heart of the provision: "A municipal corporation which adopts a home rule char-
ter may exercise any power or perform any function which the legislature has power to
devolve upon a nonhome rule charter municipal corporation and which is not denied to
the municipal corporation by its home rule charter, is not denied to all home rule charter
municipal corporations by statute and is within such limitations as may be established
by statute. This devolution of power does not include the power to enact private or civil
law governing civil relationships except as incident to an exercise of an independent mu-
nicipal power, nor does it include power to define and provide for the punishment of a
felony.
A home rule charter municipal corporation shall, in addition to its home rule pow-
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the relevance of Dillon's Rule to litigation concerning the validity of
the exercise of local government power. The question before the
courts is no longer whether a local government unit is authorized
to exercise power, but whether it is forbidden to do so by its own
charter or the state constitution or statutes. It is hoped that local
governments will be more successful defending their exercise of
initiative in court when the constitution places the burden on
their opponents to prove that they are not authorized to act, rather
than on the localities to prove that they are authorized to act. In
addition, proponents of the Fordham idea argue that the full grant
of power subject to limitation has advantages for localities in their
dealings with the legislature, because it is easier to block a legis-
lature from denying localities power than it is to secure from a
legislature authority to perform additional governmental functions. 2
SCOPE OF THE NEW FORMULA's DEVOLUTION OF POWER
Both the 1966 and the 1968 amendments to Article 6 of the
Constitution of North Dakota adopt the Fordham approach. The
principal part of the 1966 amendment is:
The legislative assembly shall provide by law for the
establishment of home rule in cities and villages. It may
authorize such cities and villages to exercise all or a portion
of any power or function which the legislative assembly has
power to devolve upon a nonhome rule city or village, not
denied to such city or village by its own home rule charter
and which is not denied to all home rule cities and villages by
statute. The legislative assembly shall not be restricted in
granting of home rule powers to home rule cities and vil-
lages by Section 183 of this constitution.
The principal part of the proposed 1968 amendment is:
The legislative assembly shall provide by law for the
establishment of home rule in cities. Home rule cities shall
have all powers of self-government except:
1. Those powers withheld from them by law;
2. Those powers not accepted by the city by its home
rule charter; and
3. Those powers prohibited by this Constitution or the
ere and except as otherwise provided in its charter, have all the powers conferred by gen-
eral law upon municipal corporations of its population class.
Charter provisions with respect to municipal executive, legislative and administra-
tive structure, organization, personnel and procedure are of superior authority to statute,
subject to the requirement that the members of the municipal legislative body be chosenby popular election, and except as to judicial review of administrative proceedings, which
shall be subject to the superior authority of statute."
12. Kresky, Looaj Government, in SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REvisio" 150, 158
(J. Wheeler, Jr.. ed. 1961).
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law of the land; provided that the legislative assem-
bly shall not be restricted in granting of home rule
powers to home rule cities by section 183 of this
Constitution.
In spite of a good deal of discussion about the fact that absent
limitation in a statute or local charter, a court in a new formula
home rule jurisdiction must find a lack of power in the state legis-
lature to act in an area in order to find a lack of power in a local
government to act in that area, the North Dakota amendments
and other proposals inspired by the A.M.A. model do not
grant coextensive or parallel power to local units. The goal elo-
quently stated by Ylvisaker which is quoted above that ". . the
concerns and the decisions which the component area can legiti-
mately undertake ought to embrace the whole range of matters
assigned to the governmental process by that society in its time,"'"
subject only to supersession by general law, has not been realized
by any new proposal. The most obvious retreat from a parallel
grant is a list of areas of governmental power which are reserved
to the state. Section 6 of the A.M.A. proposal stipulates:
This devolution of power does not include the power to
enact private or civil law governing civil relationships except
as incident to an exercise of an independent municipal
power, nor does it include power to define and provide for
the punishment of a felony.
The A.M.A. model and the present North Dakota home rule pro-
vision embody another limitation on a full grant of power to locali-
ties, known as the devolution ttest. A.M.A. Section 6 states:
A municipal corporation which adopts a home rule charter
may exercise any power or perform any function which the
legislature has power to devolve upon a nonhome rule charter
municipal corporation. ...
Article 6 of the North Dakota Constitution embodies similar
phrasing:
• . . [C]ities and villages to exercise . . . any power or func-
tion which the legislative assembly has power to devolve
upon a nonhome rule city or village. ..
The comments to the A.M.A. article assert that, "The theory of the
draft is . . . to leave a charter municipality free to exercise any
appropriate power or function except as expressly limited by
18. s'upra note S.
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charter or general statute.' 41 The introduction to the A.M.A.
article asserts that the above quoted language, "leaves room for
constitutional questions as to what powers a legislature may devolve
upon any municipality but makes nothing of the general concerns-
local affairs dichotomy."15 There is no justification for such a
devolution provision in the constitution. The language quoted from
the A.M.A. introduction admits that the draftsman deliberately in-
serted a vague provision in the constitution, not presently defined
and perhaps not capable of satisfactory definition. This vague
provision is thrust upon the courts, but the courts have no standards
for construing it. The whole point of the new formula approach is
that the allocation of power is a political or policy question best
resolved by the legislature which is the policy-setting branch of
government. Here, however, the draftsman creates "constitutional
questions" for the courts concerning the allocation issue. The prob-
lem with the devolution test is that it creates an intolerable situation
similar to the one created by the local concern-state concern dichot-
omy. The devolution test is apparently not a territorial limitation
which is a relatively clear and discrete restriction, because tra-
ditional nonhome rule local government articles often allow munici-
palities certain extraterritorial powers like, for instance, the power
to take land by eminent domain outside corporate limits for an
airport or for water supply. 16 Thus the devolution test is apparently
a limitation of the substantive, rather than the areal, powers of
local government units; there are some types of legislative activity
which are beyond local competence. What these are is ultimately
a court question.
It can be argued that the statement in the introduction to the
A.M.A. article that the devolution test "leaves room for constitutional
questions as to what powers a legislature may devolve upon any
municipality" indicates simply that the legislature must act in ac-
cordance with constitutional provisions which prohibit delegation of
power to localities or limit such delegation and that these con-
stitutional strictures directed toward the legislature are by virtue
of the devolution test applicable to home rule municipalities. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that the A.M.A. article does
not in terms require that home rule municipal corporations act
in accordance with the constitution. The same is true of the 1966
amendment to Article 6 of the Constitution of North Dakota. By
contrast, the proposed 1968 amendment to Article 6 which does
not embody the devolution test does provide that cities may not
exercise powers prohibited by the constitution. Two recent variants
14. Fordham, supra note 8, at 20 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 6.
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of the Fordham approach cast doubt on the validity of this inter-
pretation, however. Section 6 of Amended Article 2 of the Consti-
tution of Massachusetts provides in part:
Any city or town may . . . exercise any power or function
which the general court has power to confer upon it, which
is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the
general court . . . and which is not denied . . to the city or
town by its charter.
In November 1967 the voters of New York State defeated a refer-
endum proposal for a new constitution. The Local Government Ar-
ticle of this constitution provides in part:
Every local government shall have all legislative and ad-
ministrative power which the legislature has authority to
confer on it, consistent with the constitution, except as limit-
ed by statute. .... 17
The Massachusetts and New York provisions embody both the devo-
lution test and a requirement that local units act in a manner
consistent with the constitution. The obvious implication is that
the devolution test has a function other than assuring that localities
act in accordance with constitutional prohibitions. In addition, the
fact that the A.M.A. and present North Dakota home rule articles
do not require that localities act in accordance with the constitution
is not particularly significant because such a requirement can be
implied. The new formula home rule article of the Constitution of
Alaska, for instance, contains neither the devolution test nor a
requirement that local units act in accordance with the constitu-
tion.S
Although the A.M.A. proposal retreats from a constitutional
grant of full local government power by introducing the devolution
test and certain express limitations, it does make a full grant of
local government financial power. Dean Fordham, commenting on
the A.M.A. proposal has written:
Home rule powers are not very meaningful if there be not
the means of financing their exercise. There could hardly
be any doubt about this; yet it is not believed that home
rule municipalities should be beyond legislative control
16. See generally, F. SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRrrORIAL POWERS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA
(1962).
17. N.Y. CONST. Art. 11, § 2b quoted In N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1967, at 25, col. 6 (City
ed.).
18. N.Y. CONST. Art. 10, § 11. See also the constitutional proposal of the N.Y. TEMPOn-
ARY COMMISSION ON THE REVISION AND SIMPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, in FIRST STEPS
TOWARD A MODERN CONSTITUTION 16-17 (Legislative Doc. No. 58, 1959).
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with respect to the raising of revenue and the borrowing
of money. Thus the draft does not provide for a complete
autonomy in this respect. Its effect would be to give a
charter municipality broad fiscal powers except only as
might be limited by general statute or by the very home
rule charter. This is designed to leave the state legislature
in a position to erect safeguards and to coordinate state and
local fiscal affairs and policies.1 9
The National Municipal League adopted Fordham's new formula
home rule approach in the Local Government Article of the 6th
Edition of its Model State Constitution.- Like the A.M.A. proposal,
the model of the National Municipal League makes a full grant
of local government financial power. This can be determined by an
examination of Article 8, the local government article of the model,
and Article 7, the finance article, which contain no strictures on
local government power to tax or to become indebted.21 Although
neither the 1966 nor the 1968 amendment to the Municipal Corpora-
tions Article of the Constitution of North Dakota restricts home rule
power in the taxation and debt area, the constitution does include
articles which regulate taxation and public debt and a number of
the sections in these articles refer in terms to local government
units. Both the 1966 and 1968 amendments specifically exclude the
operation of the debt restrictions in Section 183, however.
2 2
A crucial issue which is often submerged in the debate on new
formula home rule is the territorial scope of the grant of power
to local government units. The various proposals are not explicit
in this regard. 23 A.M.A. Section 2 states:
19. Fordham, supra note 2, at 142.
20. NATIONAL MUNICII.L LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 94 (6th ed. 1963).
21. Unlike the National Municipal League model, the A.M.A. proposal is not a complete
constitution but includes only a local government article.
22. It is apparent that the draftsman of the 1968 amendment made a mistake when
he simply repeated the language of the 1966 amendment with respect to Section 183. Be-
cause the 1966 amendment is a permissive home rule provision; that is, it merely author-
izes or permits the legislature to devolve upon local units full governmental power, the
amendment appropriately indicates that Section 183 should not restrict the legislative as-
sembly in granting home rule power. The 1968 amendment, however, embodies a direct
constitutional grant of home rule power. Under the 1968 proposal, the only function of
the legislature is to limit local government power, not to grant it. Subsection 3 of this
amendment, therefore, should have been phrased in part in the following manner: "pro-
vided that nothing in Section 183 of this Constitution shall restrict this grant of home
rule powers." If the draftsman of the 1968 amendment did not wish to free home rule
cities from the restrictions of Section 183 without legislative authorization, he should
have rephrased Subsection 3 of the amendment by deleting the words "home rule" before
the word "power". Subsection 3 would then state in part: "provided that the legislative
assembly shall not be restricted in granting of powers to home rule cities by Section 183
of this Constitution". As rephrased, Subsection 3 of the 1968 amendment allows the legis-
lature to grant home rule cities additional powers without regard to the strictures of
Constitutional Section 183. The legislature may grant to home rule citiesi powers in addi-
tion to their home rule power. See A.M.A. proposal § 6, para. 2 quoted in n. 11, supra.
23. One commentator believes that both the American Municipal Association and Na-
tional Municipal League Home Rule Articles grant extraterritorial powers. Terrance
Sandalow, The IZmits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48
MINN. L.IR 643, 692 (1964).
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The legislature shall provide by law, general in terms and
effect, for the incorporation and government of municipal
corporations and the methods by which municipal bounda-
ries may be altered, municipal corporations may be merged
or consolidated and municipal corporations may be dissolved.
The comment discusses annexation and disannexation and asserts:
The subject is one which . . . affects three areas of interest;
the state, the general area in which the city is located and
the city proper. Thus there is ground for hesitancy over
leaving the subject to municipal control by direct constitu-
tional devolution of power. While a liberal policy toward
municipal expansion is much needed, it is not proposed here
to take responsibility away from the legislature.24
The clear implication from the comment is that extraterritorial
exercise of the police, eminent domain, or tax power is not intended
by the A.M.A. draftsman to be granted to localities "by direct con-
stitutional devolution." The implication is clear, because what the
comment asserts about annexation is equally true of the extra-
territorial exercise of the three sovereign powers; like annexation,
the extraterritorial exercise of any of these powers, "affects the
state, the general area in which the city is located and the city
proper. ' 25 But the language of Section 2 standing by itself does
not carry a clear negative implication. The section is entitled
merely "Incorporation and Corporate Changes." Although the
"powers" section of the A.M.A. draft, Section 6, does not mention
extraterritorial exercise of power either, its inclusion in the Section
6 grant of "any power . . . which the legislature has power to
devolve upon a nonhome rule charter municipal corporation and
which is not denied .. .by . . .charter . .. [or] by statute" can be
implied, because the legislature in a nonhome rule system may
devolve extraterritorial power.2 6
The comment to the Model State Constitution of the National
Municipal League states:
Under section 8.02 it is clear that the home rule locality
can act on any matter, limited by its territorial jurisdiction,
so long as it is not specifically denied the power by general
law or by its charter.2 7
There is no support for the comment in the text of Section 8.02.
24. Fordham, supra note 8, at 14.
25. The comment also Indicates on the same page: "This section ... leaves pro-
vision for merger or consolidation and for dissolution to the legislature ;" that Is, merger,
consolidation, and dissolution are not within the direct constitutional devolution of power.
ld,
26. Supra note 16.
27. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LzAOTuz MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 97 (6th e4. 1968).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
8.02 is a broad grant of power, broader even than Section 6 of
the A.M.A. draft. The only support for the comment in the National
Municipal League Local Government Article is by implication from
Section 8.01 which stipulates:
The legislature shall provide by general law ... for methods
and procedures of incorporating, merging, consolidating and
dissolving such civil divisions and of altering their boun-
daries ...
This language is similar to language in A.M.A. Section 2 discussed
above; the weakness of the implication is pointed out in the dis-
cussion on the A.M.A. provision. Section 8.01 also stipulates that
the legislature shall provide, "For the adoption or amendment of
charters by any county or city for its own government . . . ." The
phrase, "for its own government" may indicate that a municipality's
home rule charter powers are restricted territorially. The comment
to Section 8.02 is supported slightly by N.M.L. Article 11, entitled
Intergovernmental Relations:
Nothing in this constitution shall be construed ... to prohibit
. . . the cooperation of the government of any county, city,
or other civil division with any one or more other govern-
ments in the administration of their functions and powers....
If specific mention need be made of the power of a locality to
cooperate with other local governments, there is an implication
that the locality is not authorized to exercise coercive powers
extraterritorially. But the comment to Article 11 undercuts this
implication somewhat:
Since it is almost impossible to conceive that any other
provision of the Model State Constitution may be viewed as
prohibiting or limiting intergovernmental cooperation, it may
be argued that this article should be eliminated.2 8
The proposed 1968 amendment to Article 6 of the Constitution
of North Dakota states that "[h]ome rule cities shall have all
powers of self-government except. . . ." those powers specifically
listed in the amendment. The phrase "self-government" in the pro-
posed North Dakota amendment may have a meaning similar to the
phrase "for its own government" which appears in the Model State
Constitution. The implication from the phrase "self-government"
that the proposed 1968 amendment is not designed to grant extra-
territorial powers is strengthened by the proposed 1968 amendment
to Section 185 of the constitution. The proposed amendment to
28. id. at 104.
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Section 185 changes the section in part by adding the following
language:
• . . [T]he state and any of its political subdivisions may
enter into joint enterprises with each other in carrying out
their public projects to the extent authorized by law.
The comment of the North Dakota Legislative Research Committee,
which drafted the quoted language, as well as the proposed amend-
ment to Article 6, asserts:
The additional phrase makes it clear that the various
political divisions can engage in joint enterprises if the
legislative assembly permits it. Since cities may wish to join
with other cities or with the county in some projects such as
airports, sewage purification plants, water systems, or recre-
ational areas it would seem that there should be no doubt
regarding their ability to do so with the sanction of the legis-
lature.2 9
If the proposed amendment to Article 6 includes a constitutional
devolution of extraterritorial power to home rule municipalities
there would seem to be no need for legislative authorization of
joint enterprises; that is, cooperative interlocal arrangements. The
proposed amendment to Section 185 may not have negative impli-
cations with respect to the extraterritorial powers of home rule
cities, however, because it refers to all political subdivisions in-
cluding counties which are not covered by the home rule article.
It is probable that under traditional rules of construction, in parti-
cular Dillon's Rule, counties and nonhome rule cities do not have
power to enter joint enterprises with other government units without
legislative authorization. Perhaps, the proposed amendment to Sec-
tion 185 is designed merely to relieve any doubts which may arise
with respect to nonhome rule local government units. The present
home rule provision of Article 6 contains no negative implications
with respect to the devolution of extraterritorial power because it
has no counterpart to Section 2 of the A.M.A. proposal or to Section
8.01 of the N.M.L. proposal.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
If the 1966 and 1968 amendments are interpreted as allowing
the extraterritorial exercise of power granted to a local unit, a
problem of considerable complexity is created, because no stan-
dards are set forth in these amendments as to which local units
are "superior" to others in the sense that one unit can exercise
29. Supra note 1. at 26.
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its authority in the territory of another unit without being vetoed
by the unit subject to the exercise. In the absence of a controlling
statute, what is to be done when inevitable conflicts of policy
arise; for instance, the City of Grand Forks wants to take land in
Grand Forks County by eminent domain for a power plant but the
County wants to take the same land for a park or to retain its present
agricultural character in accordance with the County's zoning regu-
lations? May the locality, subject to the exercise of another locali-
ty's power, regulate that exercise as it regulates private activity?
To take the example about the power plant, may the County refuse
Grand Forks a building permit because the proposed power plant
is not allowed in the applicable zoning district? Such questions are
extremely difficult for courts to determine, since the answer is
based on a policy judgment, rather than analysis of precedents. 30
In light of the possibility that the 1966 and 1968 amendments
to Article 6 allow extraterritorial exercise of power and in light
of the fact that the number of local government units is excessive,
many local units are too small, and many even if not too small
do not serve an appropriate area, the legislature needs broad power
to reorganize the structure of local government and to mediate
and adjust conflicts among local government units. The United
States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and
the Committee for Economic Development, as well as other
authorities in the field, recommend that unsound local units be
dissolved or consolidated and that local government structures
which are characterized by a multiplicity of overlapping jurisdic-
tions be eliminated in favor of regional entities which are large
enough to achieve economies of scale, adequate revenue, and
active citizen interest in the political process. 31
The A.M.A. and N.M.L. home rule proposals require that the
legislature act by general law in essential aspects of local govern-
ment reorganization including incorporation, merger, dissolution
30. The courts may be able to decide a few of these questions by applying the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The traditional due process rule is
"minimum contacts;" i.e., there must be a constitutionally adequate relation between the
governing body and the people governed. Familiar concepts such as no taxation without
representation and government only with the consent of the governed are available as
guides for judicial determination. But an argument which may well defeat an attack based
on the "minimum contacts" theory is that the locality is exercising delegated state au-
thority, and the state has ample contacts with the territory subject to the locality's
exercise of power. The rejoinder to this argument is that the state has not delegated au-
thority to localities with adequate standards regulating its exercise; in fact, there are no
standards in the constitutional grant.
31. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 42(1966) ; U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL, AND PER-
SONNEL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 73 (October 1962). See also, County Government
R6OrgatJ0%o Study, REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESELARCH COMMLTTEE
95. 111-12 (1965).
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and annexation.82 Unlike the A.M.A. and N.M.L. proposals, neither
the 1966 nor the 1968 amendment to Article 6 of the Constitution of
North Dakota contains language specifically indicating the power
of the legislature with respect to such matters, so neither amend-
ment requires in terms that the legislature act by general law
when reorganizing local government. It appears, however, that Sec-
tions 69 and 70 require the legislature to reorganize local government
by general law. Section 70 of the Constitution of North Dakota pro-
hibits the enactment of a special law where a general law can
be made applicable, and Section 69 enumerates various situations
where a local or special law is forbidden. Subsection 33 of Section 69
forbids a local law with respect to the "incorporation of cities,
towns or villages, or changing or amending the charter of any
town, city or village," and other subsections of Section 69 forbid
local or special laws with respect to creating offices, prescribing.
the powers or duties of officers, or providing for elections. The
present wording of Article 6 may be interpreted as requiring
that the legislature act by general law, if it wishes to reorganize
local government, because the article indicates that the legislature
may not deny home rule power unless by general law; that is, by
statute which applies to all home rule localities. If the reorganiza-
tion of local government is deemed to be a denial of home rule
power, the general law requirement of present Article 6 is applicable
to legislative efforts to reorganize local governments. The recently
adopted home rule article of the Constitution of Massachusetts
allows the legislature to act by special law:
... to erect and constitute metropolitan or regional entities,
embracing any two or more cities or towns, or cities and
towns, or established with other than existing city or town
boundaries, for any general or special public purpose or pur-
poses, and to grant to these entities such powers, privileges
and immunities as the general court shall deem necessary or
expedient for the regulation and government thereof; or solely
for the incorporation or dissolution of cities or towns as cor-
porate entities, alteration of city or town boundaries, and
merger of consolidation of cities and towns, or any of these
matters. 33
The Massachusetts provision is superior to those of the American
Municipal Association and North Dakota, because it is designed to
allow the legislature to tailor a special plan for a metropolitan or
regional entity. If the legislature has to act by general law, it may
have to sacrifice a creative or original solution that would other-
82. A M.A. § 2 and N.M.L § 8.01. See also A.M.A. §§ 1 and 6 and N.M.L. § 8.02.
See. 8.08.
88. MAsS CONST. Amended Art 2. § 8.
383.
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wise be available. For instance, a special law can create a bistate
government for the City of Grand Forks. A general law cannot do
this because a bistate solution may not be appropriate for Fargo
or for other cities on the borders of the state.3 4
A number of new formula home rule proposals limit the grant
of power to certain localities, rather than extend it to all local
units. The N.M.L. limits home rule to cities and counties. The Alaska
Constitution places the limit at cities and boroughs (Article 10,
Section 11). The A.M.A. limits home rule to municipal corporations
and indicates in the comment that a population minimum may be
added, if desired.35 There are three reasons for limitation on the
group of local units to receive home rule power. First, a smaller
group helps to minimize conflict among home rule localities and
ease the legislature's task of allocating power and functions among
them. Second, broad home rule power should be vested in only
those local governments capable of exercising broad power."6 New
formula home rule could be retrogressive if granted to structurally
unsound local units. Third, reorganization of local government is
made more possible if structurally unsound local units are not given
constitutional status and recognition. Flexibility is achieved by ex-
cluding them from the constitution. 37 Both the 1966 and 1968 amend-
ments to Article 6 of the Constitution of North Dakota devolve home
rule power upon some localities which serve an extremely small
population-3  This devolution is subject to criticism for the three
34. Although the Constitution of North Dakota does not authorize the legislature to
act by special law in the critical area of local government reorganization, the actual dif-
ference from the approach of Massachusetts Is not great because of the doctrine of clas-
sification. Section 3 of the A.M.A. draft forbids the legislature to classify localities In
more than four groups or to include fewer than two localities in a class, but the Constitu-
tion of North Dakota is silent as to classification. Cases construing both § 69 and § 70
have held that reasonable classification is valid. Vermont L. and T. Co. v. Whithed, 2
N.D. 82, 49 N.W. 318 (1891); Baird v. Rask, 60 N.D. 432, 234 N.W. 651 (1931). By
classifying the legislature can achieve almost the same flexibility which is available
when the legislature is authorized to act by special law. In addition, If the act of leg-
islative reorganization is not within one of the enumerated cases of § 69, It Is con-
trolled by § 70. Because the courts have held that whether a general law can be
made applicable is purely a legislative question and the decision of the law making
power in this respect is subject to no judicial review, the legislature may determine that
due to the complexities of local government reorganization, the matter must be resolved
by special law. Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N.D. 270, 50 N.W. 970 (1891).
It can be argued that the North Dakota Constitution is defective because, unlike
the A.M.A. and Massachusetts provisions, it does not restrict classification. Judicial ac-
ceptance of rather narrow classification and the doctrine that whether a general law can
be made applicable is a legislative question has allowed the legislature to interfere un-
duely with matters appropriately resolved at the local level by enacting statutes which
are special in their terms or effect. The Massachusetts Home Rule Article seeks to avoid
legislative abuse by not only restricting classification but also limiting the special law
power of the legislature to carefully defined areas. Amended Art. 2, § 8.
35. Fordham, supra note 8, at 18.
36. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVEOPMEINT, MODERNIZING LocAL GovEIMMENT 48
(1966). U.S. AnvIsORy COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND STATUTORY ItESTRICTIONS UPON THE STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL AND PER
-
SONNEL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 73 (October 1962).
37. Supra note 12, at 152; s8ura note 27, at 95.
38. Although the 1968 amendment applies only to cities, as distinct from the 1966
amendment which applies to both cities and villages, both amendments apply to village-
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reasons just listed. The third reason has force because of political
realities and the possibility that the courts may hold that the home
rule amendment bars the legislature from eliminating a home rule
municipality or from even amending its charter.A9 The comment to
the draft of the American Municipal Association specifically indi-
cates that this judicial interpretation is not intended to result from
the A.M.A. language.4 0  Although there is some ambiguity with
respect to the proposed 1968 amendment to Article 6, it is clear
that the article's present wording cannot be construed as barring
the legislature from revoking or altering the charter of a home
rule city, because the present article embodies a permissive home
rule provision. Since under a permissive home rule system the
legislature, not the constitution, grants home rule power, the legis-
lature should be able to terminate or alter the power.41
CONFLICT AND PREEMPTION DOCTRINES
The conflict and preemption doctrines should apply to legis-
lative activity relating to new formula home rule localities, because
the legislature needs the assistance of the judiciary's reasoned
elaboration of statutory law in establishing the details of the new
system of state-local relations. The courts exercise an important
interstitial or subordinate policy making role in the regulatory proc-
ess by finding that a statute impliedly supersedes conflicting ordi-
nances or excludes local legislative activity.42 Creative interpreta-
tion by the judiciary compensates for the legislature's failure to
be omniscient, for its failure to foresee all the possible actions of
subordinate units which are contrary to the interest of the state.
The broad power granted to localities by the new formula is designed
to free the legislature from the traditional home rule task of acting
on requests by local units for authorizing legislation. But if new
formula home rule does not allow for the operation of the conflict
size units, because Chapter 323, § 283 of the Laws of the 40th Legislative Session (1967)
provides for the mandatory transition of villages to cities.
39. J. KZ.ITH, in Crry AND COUNTY Homm RuI rn TnxAs 34, 95 (1951), states that
the courts have so held in Texas.
40. Fordham, stUsra note 8, at 14-15. See also, supra note 2, at 141.
41. Even if the power of the North Dakota legislature to reorganize local government
is not limited by the constitutional status of home rule localities, it is restricted by the
provisions in the constitution concerning counties, local units which are not granted
home rule power. Section 167 provides, in part, that the legislature can effect the con-
solidation or dissolution of counties only by general law and then only with the consent
of 55% of those voting on the question in each county effected. Section 168 provides that
the boundaries of organized counties cannot be changed without the affirmative vote of a
majority of voters in each county effected. These and other sections in Article 10 severely
inhibit legislative power to restructure local government. The effect of these sections Is
clear: There has been virtually no change in the county system. Voluntary county con-
solidation or other reorganization has not met with success anywhere in the United
States. REPORT OF NORTH DAICOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARcH CoMMITTEE 107 (1965).
42. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Comment on Courts and Law Maling, in LEGAL INSTITU-
TIONS TODAY AND ToMORROW 40, 43, 45 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959) for a discussion of the
judiciary's role in interpreting legislation.
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and preemption doctrines, it puts a much greater burden on the
legislature than traditional home rule: without the conflict and pre-
emption doctrines, statutory regulation of an exercise of local govern-
ment power can be accomplished only by explicit mention of the
exercise, a limitation which is a formidable obstacle to effective
legislative supervision of local government activity.
The comment to the American Municipal Association model
states that the model:
. . . [E]mphatically reverses the old strict-constructionist
presumption against the existence of municipal power and,
so long as the legislature does not expressly deny a parti-
cular power, renders unnecessary petitioning the legislature
for enabling legislation. 3
The comment to the Model State Constitution of the National Mu-
nicipal League claims that, ". . . the county or city has the power
to act unless the power has been specifically denied." 44 If these
comments are accurate, one must conclude that the courts are
unable to perform their interpretative function and that the legis-
lature is either burdened with endless specification of prohibited
activity or forced to destroy the constitutional scheme by elimi-
nating government power with blanket prohibitions and reserva-
tions. In fact, however, the language of the A.M.A. and N.M.L.
proposals can be construed to allow the operation of the conflict
and preemption doctrines.4 5 A.M.A. Section 6 states in part:
A municipal corporation . . . may exercise any power or
perform any function which . . . is not denied to that mu-
nicipal corporation by its home rule charter, is not denied
to all home rule charter municipal corporations by statute
and is within such limitations as may be established by
statute.
First of all the phrase "expressly denied" or "specifically denied"
does not appear. The mere word "denied" can be construed as
including implied denial incident to conflict between state law and
a local ordinance or incident to state law which "occupies the field"
in order to achieve uniformity or for some other regulatory pur-
pose.4 6 A better basis for the conflict and preemption doctrines is
48. Fordham, eupra note 8, at 20. (emphasis added). See a/lo R. MOTT, HOME RULE
FOR AMERICA'S CITIEs 10 (1949).
44. Supra note 27. (emphasis added).
45. John E. Keith, a member of the executive staff of the National Municipal League
and a draftsman of the League's Model State Constitution, has written that a require-
ment that the legislature expressly overrule municipal action is not workable. Supro note
4, at 140.
46. The home rule proposal of the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations explicitiy distinguishes between express denials and denials which take
the form of legislative pre-emption. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
UPON THE STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL AND PERSON0NEL POWERS oF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 74
(1962).
HOME RULE
the distinction between "denied" and "within such limitations as
may be established by statute." It can be argued that this dis-
tinction is between express denials mentioned in the comments
and the general body of statutory law to which the conflict and
preemption doctrines apply. Section 8.02 of the N.M.L. draft is sub-
ject to similar construction. Massachusetts Article 2, Section 6,
states in part:
Any city or town may . . . exercise any power or function
. . . which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws
enacted by the general court . . . and which is not denied
either expressly or by clear implication to the city or town
by its charter.
The Massachusetts variation of the new formula for constitutional
home rule gives recognition to the conflict and preemption doctrines
by the use of the word "inconsistent," especially in contrast to the
phrase "denied . . . expressly." The home rule provision of Article
6 of the Constitution of North Dakota differs significantly from Sec-
tion 6 of the American Municipal Association proposal. Section 6
grants home rule power which "is not denied to all home rule charter
municipal corporations by statute and is within such limitations
as may be established by statute." Article 6 grants home rule power
"which is not denied to all home rule cities and villages by statute"
but does not include the phrase concerning "limitation by statute."
As indicated above, the distinction between denial and limitation
in both the A.M.A. and N.M.L. model home rule provisions may
enable the courts to interpret the phrase "limitation by statute"
as allowing the operation of the conflict and preemption doctrines.
If the phrase "limitation by statute" is deleted, as it is in Article
6, perhaps, a contrary interpretation is required. On the other hand,
the word "denied" is not modified by the word "expressly" and
so can be construed as including implied denial. The proposed 1968
amendment to Article 6 grants power to home rule cities except
"those powers withheld from them by law." In view of alternative
language available to the draftsman of the 1968 proposal, such as a
phrase excepting powers inconsistent with law, the term "withheld"
may be interpreted as requiring the legislature to act expressly
and specifically if it wishes to restrict home rule power.
EXISTING LAW
The legislature determines the breadth of power devolved upon
home rule localities by a new formula home rule provision by
limiting the devolution. It is for this reason that proponents of the
new formula for home rule stress that a favorable political climate
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is essential to the success of the new system of state-local relations47
But even if the legislature were to adopt a liberal attitude toward
home rule localities and place few limits on their power, home
rule localities would not benefit significantly from the new formula
unless the great body of existing statutory law relating to mu-
nicipalities is deemed not to be applicable to them. In this great
body of statutory law are a profusion of restrictive provisions which
are not in accord with the spirit of the new formula and which
would destroy its effectiveness, if found to be applicable to home
rule units. 8 Because the laws of North Dakota relating to mu-
nicipalities were drafted to operate in a nonhome rule system, it
can be argued that these laws do not apply to home rule cities. 9
Furthermore, it can be argued that a statute enacted to enable non-
home rule localities to exercise certain powers cannot be construed
simply because of its limited grant as denying or withholding de-
volved home rule power. This is an especially forceful argument
with respect to statutes enacted prior to the home rule amendment
to the constitution. If the courts hold that existing law relating to
cities is applicable to home rule units, the legislature must review
this law to determine which statutes should be declared applicable
only to nonhome rule cities.
PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE NORTH DAKOTA AMENDMENTS
Essential to home rule, whether traditional or new formula,
is the right of a locality to draft its own charter. Both the 1966 and
1968 amendments to the Constitution of North Dakota state that
"the legislative assembly shall provide by law for the establishment
of home rule;" that is, the legislature is required to pass a statute
which enables home rule cities to design and adopt a charter. The
North Dakota amendments are mandatory though not self-execut-
ing; they do not set out procedures for the establishment of home
rule but require the legislature to do so. Section 8.01 of the N.M.L.
proposal is similar in this regard but more explicit:
The legislature shall provide by general law for . . . the
adoption or amendment of charters by any county or city
for its own government, by a majority vote of the qualified
voters of the city or county voting thereon, for methods and
procedures for the selection of charter commissions, and
for framing, publishing, disseminating and adopting such
47. Fordham, supra note 8, at 10-12.
48. N.Y. TSMPOnARY COMMISSION ON THE REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION, FIRST STEPS TOWARD A MODERN CONSTITUTION 20 (Legislative Doc. No. 58, 1959).
49. See, for instance, a Texas case, Forward v. City of Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 282, 285
(Tex. 1948) which states that the cities of Texas are divided into three classes by their
mode of incorporation and that a statute expressly applicable to one class does not apply
to the others.
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charters or charter amendments and for meeting the ex-
penses connected therewith.
The N.M.L. comments indicate that the section is not self-executing,
because the draftsman wished to free the constitution from pro-
cedural details and felt that if such details were left to legislation
they could be modified more easily to reflect changing conditions. 50
The risk of the mandatory but not self-executing approach of the
North Dakota amendments and N.M.L. proposal is that the legis-
lature will fail to respond to the constitutional mandate and, there-
fore, new formula home rule powers will not be made available
to localities. Section 4 of the A.M.A. draft attempts to eliminate this
risk by providing that if the legislature does not establish ade-
quate procedures for charter making, a local legislative body may
do so, and if the local legislature fails to do so, it can be compelled
to act by a judicial proceeding.
The 1966 amendment to Article 6 of the Constitution of North
Dakota is not self-executing procedurally or substantively; the legis-
lature is directed to provide procedures for municipalities to adopt
home rule charters and authorized to devolve substantive powers.
This type of provision is called "permissive home rule," because
the constitution does not devolve power directly but merely per-
mits the legislature to grant home rule power. 51 As of 1961, the
constitutions of 13 states provided for permissive home rule, but
the legislatures in three of these states had not devolved home rule
power and the legislatures in a number of them had devolved only
power of rather limited scope. 52 The Pennsylvania legislature took
27 years to act under that state's permissive home rule amend-
ment. 53 There is a substantial risk that the legislature of North
Dakota will not implement the present home rule article or will
do so by making only a parsimonious grant of power. The present
wording of Article 6 is ambiguous, because the legislature is merely
authorized to grant home rule power but is required to provide for
charter making. This ambiguity may be resolved by interpreting
the requirement that the legislature "provide by law for the estab-
lishment of home rule" as including not only procedures for charter
making but also substantive powers. Such an interpretation is
strained, however, since the article states that the legislative as-
sembly may authorize, not shall authorize, municipalities to exer-
cise power. The second sentence of the second paragraph of Article
6 is subject to the interpretation that the legislature cannot grant
50. Supra note 27, at 96.
51. Supra note 7, at 12-13.
52. Id. at 159-60.
53. Id. at 183.
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power which has been denied by a general law, without first specif-
ically repealing the general law. Because this reading places a
considerable burden on legislative implementation of the article,
it probably was not intended.
The proposed 1968 amendment to Article 6 attempts to eliminate
the ambiguities of the present home rule wording and to substitute
for permissive home rule a self-executing devolution of power. Al-
though the proposed 1968 amendment is a definite improvement
over the 1966 amendment because it is self-executing, it fails to
relieve the ambiguity of Article 6. The proposed 1968 amendment
creates new uncertainties by describing the grant of authority to
home rule cities as "all powers of self-government" instead of as
"any power or function," the phrase introduced by the A.M.A.
model54 The phrase "local self government," or its occasional vari-
ant "self government," appears in both traditional and new formula
home rule provisions and is notable for the judicial confusion which
it has caused. Professor McBain in his classic work on home rule
asserts that the phrase is unprecise and indefinite and criticizes
its operation in the traditional home rule provisions of Ohio and
Colorado. 55 Later commentators also have noted the confusion
with respect to this phrase.5 6 Because "local self government" or
"self government" generally is identified with the concept of home
rule, the meaning of the phrase varies with differing ideas of the
scope of home rule and the way that it can best be achieved. The
judiciary usually interprets "local self government" or "self govern-
ment" in traditional home rule articles as expressing the distinction
between matters off local and state concern: The right of a locality to
govern itself is equated with its right to exercise initiative power with
respect to local matters. The term "local self government" or "self-
government" is often used by advocates of new formula home rule
to express one of its key goals,5 8 but because of judicial interpreta-
54. The formula is adopted in FORDHAM, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MU-
NICIPA&L HOME RULE § 6 (1953) ; MASS. CONST., Amended Art. 2 § 6; N.M.I MODEL STATE
CONSTITUTION Art. 8 § 8.02 (6th ed. 1963). The latter constitutional provision adopts the
phrase "all legislative powers" rather than simply "all powers".
55. EL McB.iN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOs-s RULE 668, 670 (1916).
See OHIO CONST. Art. 18, § 3 and COLO. CONST. Art. 20 § 6. See also PA. CONST. Art. 15,§ 1.
56. See supra note 7, at 128; Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Munktpal Power Un-
der Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 643, 660 (1964). See
also, in CITY AND COUNTY HOME RULE IN TEXAS 131-133 (1951), John P. Keith's discus-
sion of the confusion of the judiciary with respect to the Texas home rule article and
its enabling act. The home rule article of Texas does not include the "local self-govern-
ment" phrase but the enabling act does. The courts of Texas have variously interpreted
the home rule provisions as giving local initiative on matters of local concern, as incor-
porating the devolution test, and as devolving all legislative power.
57. see McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL COnPORATIONs, § 1.93, at 342 (3d ed. 1949) for a dis-
cussion of the equivalence of the phrase "local self government" with the concept of home
rule.
58. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Special Committee
on the Constitutional Convention: Local Government and Finance 13 (April 1967);
KmTH, Crry AND CouwT Hohr RULE IN TEXAS 29 (1951); eutpra note 48, at 15.
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tion of "local self government" in the context of traditional home
rule, new formula provisions usually avoid the phrase in the section
devolving power, although the phrase occasionally appears in an
introductory section stating the purpose of the new formula pro-
vision.59 The comment to the proposed 1968 amendment to Article
6 states that, ". . . the grant of all power to home rule cities with
specific exemptions . . . [is] a more easily comprehensible method
of providing for home rule than the method used in [the present
article],6° The specific exemptions referred to are the three num
bered exceptions of the proposed amendment. According to the
comment, the proposed 1968 amendment grants all power except
for the specific exemptions, thus "self-governmnt" should not be
construed as limiting the grant to matters of local concern. The fact
that the proposed amendment drops the word "local" from "local
self government" may be further indication that the phrase "self-
government" should not be construed as introducing the distinction
between state and local concern. Earlier in this article it was sug-
gested that "self-government" may refer to the territorial extent
of home rule power.
It has been stated:
No constitutional or legal draftsman has yet devised an
entirely satisfactory word formula to lay down a division
of power between a general and local government when each
has functions to perform in the same area and with the
same population.8 '
This is an appropriate concluding comment, because it reflects
the history of state-local relations in the United States. Tra-
ditional home rule was a reaction to the shortcomings of a non-
home rule system. New formula home rule is a reaction to the
shortcomings of traditional home rule. Although the ideal of a seam-
less web, of shared powers, is appropriate for this country's system
of overlapping governments operating under modern social con-
ditions, the new formula home rule models achieve this ideal
only partially and both the North Dakota amendments are signifi-
cantly more defective than the models. The proposed 1968 amend-
ment is superior to the present wording of Article 6, because it is
self-executing; its passage would grant North Dakota cities home
59. MAss. CONsT. Amended Art. 2 § 1; § 1 of home rule article proposed in First
Steps Toward a Modern Constitution, supra note 48, at 16. See also, Art. 11, § 1 of con-
stitulon proposed in a referendum to the voters of New York State in November 1967
and ALAs. CONST. Art. 10, § 1. The local government article of the Alaska Constitution
and of the proposed New York Constitution provide for both home rule and non home
rule localities.
60. REPoRT OF THE NoRTH DAKOTA LEOISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE 20 (1967).
61. Supra note 48, at 17.
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rule power, power which can contribute to the solution of pressing
problems, if the judiciary and legislature act creatively in clarify-
ing the ambiguities of the amendment and in determining the details
of the new pattern of state-local relations.
